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abstract
There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the subject 
can perceive the object: perceiving an object makes it possible to think about it in a very direct and 
straightforward way. This is so because perception of the object makes a subject aware of the object 
itself. But what is it to be (perceptually) aware of something? Moreover, how does such an awareness 
have to be accounted for? According to a very influential proposal leading back to Gareth Evans (1982), 
the kind of awareness that can home a subject’s thought on an object has to be cashed out in terms of 
singular object-dependent modes of presentation understood as ways of having discriminating (albeit 
non-descriptive) knowledge of the object. Contra Evans I shall claim that modes of presentation thus 
characterized do not account for perceptual awareness, but rather presuppose it.
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The bulk of my paper is about the role that perception plays in our thinking about ordinary, 
environmental objects. It does not concern the traditional epistemic question of whether 
and how perception can justify our knowledge claims about the world. Rather, it concerns 
an issue which I think is preliminary to it and that should be settled in advance of any 
theorization about the epistemic, justificatory role of perception. This preliminary question is 
the following: how does perceiving an object make it possible to think about it? Dealing with 
such a question is of pivotal importance in order to understand the complex interplay between 
perception and thought and, more generally, the role that perception plays in our cognitive 
lives.
The question raised presupposes of course that perception (alone, or in combination with 
some other features) makes it possible to think about objects in our environment. It does not 
presuppose instead that perception is necessary (directly or indirectly) in order for any kind 
of thought to home in on an object. As a matter of fact, there are many kinds of thoughts 
that fix their aboutness utterly independently from perception. This is the case for example 
of all those thoughts that are about entities (such as numbers for example) whose abstract 
nature puts them outside the perceptual domain. But, even as regards concrete and therefore 
perceivable entities, perception is not necessary either. One can think of a concrete object 
without perceiving it, or even without ever having perceived it. Our question therefore only 
concerns those cases in which an object is within the subject’s perceptual reach and ken. As 
regards these cases our main aim is to understand what role perception plays and how its 
playing such a role makes for a substantive difference in the way of functioning of perception-
based thoughts. 
Most people, and I side with them, agree in claiming that the way of functioning of perception-
based (or more generally information-based) thoughts is different and irreducible to the 
way of functioning of thoughts which are not so based. While the latter fix their aboutness 
by specifying a set of descriptive identifying conditions (i.e. the conditions that something 
has to satisfy in order to qualify as the object the thought is about), the former fix it in a 
more direct way, a way that crucially depends on the existence of an information-perceptual 
link with the object itself.1 But how does being perceptually linked with an object, being in 
1  A distinction often used in this connection is that between satisfactional vs. relational models of the determination 
of the aboutness of a given thought.
1. Introduction
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contact with an object through one’s perception of it, make available a way of thinking of the 
object that does not require the kind of cognitive, conceptual sophistication that is needed 
when the object is not perceptually available? A crucial step in answering this question goes 
through an understanding of the presentational role that perception plays in this connection. 
Clarifying this point helps in fixing one of the main differences between perceiving something 
and thinking of something. Both states are intentional in the sense of having directedness or 
aboutness. In so far as they are intentional, they present something to the subject (McGinn, 
1988, p. 300). But, and here comes one crucial difference between them, the way in which the 
object is present is different in the two cases. Let me clarify this difference: in perception, the 
object is present merely in virtue of being there and within the subject’s perceptual ken and 
reach (to have the object in view on the part of the subject only requires that her eyes are 
open and that she pays sufficient attention to it). Not so as regards thinking. In this case, the 
object’s being present is the result of its being presented, that is: there must be something that 
puts the object before “the mind’s eyes”, so to say. In other terms, there must be something 
playing a presentational role. Thoughts differ as regards what plays this role: differences in 
ways of functioning have to do with what plays the presentational role and how. For thoughts 
that function according to the satisfactional model, the presentational role is played by a 
descriptive component in the thought’s content (a component that specifies the conditions 
that something has to satisfy for being eligible as the object the thought is about). As regards 
perception-based thoughts however, the presentational role is played (wholly or partly) by 
perception itself. The object is presented (is brought before the eyes’s mind) in virtue of its 
being present in one’s perception of it. Perception puts us in contact with the object in such a 
way as to enable our thoughts to home in directly on it. But what kind of perceptual contact 
is required to that end? In particular, is a mere informational contact sufficient to home a 
subject’s thought on the object that is the source of the information, or what is needed is 
something over and above a mere information-link?
In the next section I shall present Evans’s account of perception-based thoughts that is one 
of the most influential theoretical proposals that have been put forward in order to address 
the above mentioned issues. According to Evans, the existence of a mere information-causal 
link is not sufficient to account for the kind of perceptual contact with an object suited to 
ground a thought about it. What more is required, according to Evans, is something that 
accounts for the subject’s awareness of the object. In trying to account for such an awareness, 
Evans introduced modes of presentation of the objects conceived as ways of identifications 
that strictly depend on the existence of an information-link with the object. These modes 
are singular, object-dependent and very fine-grained. According to Evans, they are modes 
of presentations so conceived that account for the object’s being perceptually presented to 
the thinking subject. Even though I agree that perception-based thoughts involve modes of 
presentation of their objects different from those involved in thoughts that function according 
to the satisfactional model, I disagree on how modes of presentations have to be conceived in 
order to provide awareness of the object. In particular, I shall claim that (i) Evans’s modes of 
presentation do not account for the subject’s awareness of the object, but rather presuppose 
it; and (ii) to account for such awareness one needs modes of presentations playing the role of 
ways of appearing. 
After having introduced Evans’s account, I shall take into consideration a criticism recently 
raised by Michelle Montague (2016) against it. Even though Montague’s criticism and my 
own one present strong similarities, the way in which I propose to correct the inadequacies 
of Evans’s account is very different from Montague’s. The main difference has to do with 
the account provided of the role of appearances. Whereas she characterizes them in purely 
subjective, phenomenological terms, I opt for a characterization that makes room for 
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appearances conceived as objective and mind-independent features of objects. In my view 
only such an account is consistent with Evans’ s claim that perception makes available ways 
of thinking that are about their object in a direct, non-descriptive, non-inferential way. The 
emerging picture provides an account of acquaintance which turns out to be closer to Russell’s 
way of conceiving it than Evans’s was, while avoiding at the same time the pitfalls of the sense 
datum theory that led Evans to part company from Russell’s characterization of that notion. 
I shall here confine my attention to perceptual demonstrative thoughts,2 that is thoughts 
that are typically expressed by sentences in which present-tense demonstratives occur such 
as “That G is F” (i.e. “that tree over there is a Pohutukawa”, “that bird is a Kiwi”, “that cup 
is yellow”). These are thoughts about spatio-temporal objects which are made available to a 
thinking subject on the ground of his standing in a perceptual relation with the objects his 
thought is about.
Evans’s account of this kind of thoughts qualifies as an acquaintance-based account. In order 
to get a grip on the peculiarity of Evans’s proposal it has to be stressed that there are two 
main families of such accounts: the epistemic and the causal ones.3 Both depart radically 
from Russell’s characterization of the notion of acquaintance,4 mainly on the ground that 
it promotes an unbearable restriction of its extent to only sensible particulars, universals 
and abstract logical facts (1914, p. 127).5 What motivates both parties in taking this move 
away from Russell is the willingness to accommodate within the relational model of genuine 
reference our ordinary reference to mind-independent objects. This point of agreement 
notwithstanding, the two families differ radically as regards the requirements they put on 
the acquaintance relation. Whereas the latter claims that a causal connection with the object 
is sufficient to ground a thought about it, the former, while acknowledging the relevance 
of causal links (and more generally of external constraints), stresses the need of an internal 
constraint (which is characterized in epistemic terms). Evans in The Varieties of Reference 
provided one of the most comprehensive account of the epistemic variety of the acquaintance-
based model by criticizing the rival, merely causal, account that he labelled the “Photograph 
model” of singular mental reference. In that work, in the attempt to extend the application 
domain of the relational (i.e. non-satisfactional) model beyond Russell’s strictures, in full 
2  Perceptual demonstratives thoughts are for Evans a proper sub-class of demonstrative thoughts. Demonstrative 
thoughts for him include also spatial thoughts – of which “Here-thoughts” represent the paradigmatic case – and 
“I-thoughts” which are typically expressed by sentences in which a token of the first-person pronoun occurs. What 
motivates Evans in working with a unified category of demonstrative thoughts is a couple of ideas. First, the idea 
that all these thoughts share the same kind of identification of their aboutness. Second, the idea that the three kinds 
in question are not autonomous but complementary. In his account he illustrates the interplay between the three 
kinds by showing that one cannot demonstratively identify an object without at the same time being able to identify 
the place it occupies, where this identification requires, in turn, the capacity on the part of the thinking subject to 
conceive of himself as an object among others.
3  For the difference between these two accounts and their respective pros and cons see Hawthorne & Manley (2012).
4  For Russell’s characterization of the notion see Russell, 1911, pp. 209-210; 1912, p. 46 and 1914, p. 127. In these 
passages Russell characterizes acquaintance as a dual cognitive relation between subject and object, a relation that 
provides awareness of the object in the most possible direct way, that is without the intermediary of any process 
of inference or any knowledge of truth. For Russell, acquaintance is the most basic cognitive relation in the sense 
of being presupposed by all other cognitive relation (among which he mentions: attention, sensation, memory, 
imagination, believing, disbelieving).
5  For Russell (1912, p. 51) we have acquaintance in sensation with the data of what he calls the outer senses, in 
introspection with the data of what he calls the inner sense, in memory with things that have been data either of 
the outer senses or of the inner sense. He also admits that we have acquaintance with universals, logical forms and 
(perhaps) oneself.
2. Evans’s account 
of perception-
based thoughts
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adherence with “Russell’s Principle” (RP) (also known as “the know-which requirement”),6 
Evans promoted a radical revision of Russell’s picture whose upshot is his neo-Fregean theory 
of singular, object-dependent thoughts. 
Before illustrating the main points of departure from Russell’s theory, it is worth stressing the 
extent of Evans’s agreement with Russell. First of all, Evans agrees with Russell on the idea that 
genuine referential expressions do not function in the way in which definite descriptions do. 
The main difference between the two kinds of expressions amounts to the fact that in the case 
of the former, but not of the latter, their contribution to the thought (proposition in Russell’s 
terminology) expressed depends on their having a referent, in such a way that if there is no 
referent there is no thought/proposition expressed.7 The second point of agreement is the idea 
that what has to be considered in order to account for the different way in which the various 
referential expressions perform their common function – i.e. that of identifying an object – is 
the way in which the thoughts expressed by utterances in which referential expressions occur 
are about the objects they are about (Evans, 1982, p. 64). Thirdly, Evans agrees with Russell on 
the idea that what has to be considered in order to account for the way in which the aboutness 
of a given thought is secured is the kind of knowledge of the object that a subject has to have 
in order to think the thought in question, or, which amounts to the same in his view, in order 
to understand an utterance which expresses it. Finally, he agrees with Russell on the idea that 
genuine singular thoughts have to be grounded (on pain of the whole system of identification 
failing to be tied down to a unique set of objects)8 on a kind of knowledge of the object 
radically different from knowledge by description. The kind of knowledge in question depends 
on the subject’s being en rapport with the objects of her thought in such a way that no such 
thought would be available if the objects in question did not exist and the subject did not stand 
in this particular kind of relation with them. 
These points of agreement notwithstanding, Evans disagrees with Russell on the idea that the 
only objects about which one can have direct non-inferential knowledge are mind-dependent 
ones. 
Let us now consider how Evans’s project of extending the relational model beyond Russell’s 
narrow limits in full adherence to the “know-which requirement” is achieved. There are at 
least four points that need to be acknowledged to appreciate Evans’s project. The first two 
are: (1) the rejection of Russell’s interpretation of genuine epistemic requirements upon 
direct reference as requirements of infallibility, and (2) the rejection of Russell’s Cartesian 
conception of the mind.9 The adoption of these two points – which corresponds to the first 
step of Evans’s strategy – makes it possible to extend Russell’s model of acquaintance to 
ordinary spatio-temporal, mind-independent objects. The other step of his strategy – which 
aims at making the obtained extension compatible with the dictates of (RP) – is achieved 
6  The requirement according to which in order for a subject to have a thought – or to make a judgment – about an 
object she must have knowledge of which object is in question (Russell 1912: 58). For the connection between Russell’s 
Principle and the Principle of acquaintance see Sacchi 2001, pp. 21-29.
7  Thoughts expressed by genuine referential expressions are thus claimed to be “object-dependent” or, as Evans 
labels them, “Russellian thoughts”.
8  Evans is here considering the problem of “massive reduplication” raised by Strawson (1959, chp. 1).
9  The two points are strictly connected: it was Russell’s adherence to a Cartesian conception of the mind (and in 
particular to the idea that we have infallible and authoritative knowledge of the items in the mental domain) that 
motivated his peculiar way of interpreting the nature of the epistemic requirements upon direct reference. The 
upshot of Evans’s move is to acknowledge that we are directly knowledgeably open to the world in thought, even 
though our “openness” is intrinsically fallible. This is so because, according to Evans, which contents we happen to 
entertain depends (among other things) on which objects in the world we directly interact with, objects about whose 
existence and nature we cannot be infallible.
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though (3) the rejection of the idea that Russell’s intuitions about the functioning of genuine 
referential expressions are incompatible with the ascription to those expressions of a sense, 
and (4) the acknowledgment of the possibility of non-descriptive singular senses. These non-
descriptive modes of identification are, according to Evans, singular object-dependent senses. 
They are ways of identification of particulars that depend for their existence on the identified 
particulars themselves. In Evans’s Frege-inspired revision of Russell’s relational model of 
singular reference the kind of direct, non-inferential knowledge of the object able to ground 
non-descriptive thoughts amounts to the subject’s practical ability to discriminate the object 
of her thought from any other objects, on the ground of the subject’s standing, or having been 
stood, in some kind of direct, experiential, contextual relation with the object itself, where the 
paradigm of this kind of relation is provided by (even though not restricted to) the perceptual 
case (Evans, 1982, chp. 5).
Crucial in Evans’s proposal was a drastic revision of the notion of experience. Evans replaced 
Russell’s somewhat technical use of the notion – which was motivated by Russell’s idea that 
the term ‘experience’ must not be used uncritically in philosophy on account of the “vague, 
fluctuating and ambiguous” meaning of the term in its ordinary use (Russell, 1914, p. 129) – 
with a use according to which experiencing an object means consciously receiving information 
from it. But for Evans, unlike Russell, experiencing an object is not sufficient in order for a 
subject to have knowledge of the object. Having knowledge of the object is for Evans having a 
discriminating knowledge, acquired on the basis of the subject’s receiving or having received 
information from the object. This kind of discriminating knowledge does not amount to 
possessing some piece of propositional knowledge. Rather, it is a kind of “practical” knowledge 
(knowledge of the “know-how” variety) which manifests itself in the subject’s capacity to 
attend selectively to a single thing over a period of time or, as Evans puts it, a capacity to keep 
track of it. Having this discriminating ability is for Evans to possess an “idea” of an object. In 
turn, having an idea of an object amounts to having a general ability that “makes it possible 
for a subject to think of an object in a series of indefinitely many thoughts, in each of which he 
will be thinking of it in the same way” (1982, p. 104).10
I think that Evans was right in stressing, against what he called “the Photograph Model”, 
that a correct account of perceptual demonstrative thoughts requires not only an external 
constraint but also an internal one. The role of the internal constraint was to account in his 
view for the way in which the object is presented. In stressing the role of a “presentational 
element” in an acquaintance-based account of mental reference Evans showed adhesion to an 
important aspect of Russell’s picture, according to which the acquaintance relation between 
subject and object is the converse of the relation between object and subject which constitutes 
presentation (Russell, 1911, pp. 209-210). A subject is acquainted with an object only insofar 
as the object is experientially presented to him. But what kind of presentedness has to be in 
place in order for one to stand in an acquaintance relation with something suited to ground a 
thought about it? Moreover, does Evans’s account provide an adequate characterization of it? 
Evans’s account has been very influential in all the subsequent philosophical debate on the 
intersection between perception and thought. Some scholars have tried to develop more 
broadly some of Evans’s insights by preserving his main tenets while others have taken a 
more radical critical attitude towards his proposal. Some people have criticized Evans’s 
idea that perceptual demonstrative identification requires the capacity on the part of the 
thinking subject to locate the object in the objective space. Contra Evans, people like Campbell 
10  This is called the “Generality Constraint” that Evans put on the possession conditions of concepts.
3. Revising Evans’s 
account
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(2002, p. 112) for example, have contested the necessity of Evans’s internal requirement by 
claiming that a subject can entertain a perceptual demonstrative thought about an object 
even though she is wrong about the object’s actual location.11 Here we will not consider those 
criticisms that contest the necessity of Evans’s requirements; rather, we shall concentrate on 
criticisms that are targeted on their sufficiency. One such criticism has recently been raised 
by Montague (2016) in the context of developing an account of what she labels the “access 
problem” and that she presents as “the problem of giving a characterization of the mechanism 
that determines which particular object a subject is perceiving or thinking of on a particular 
occasion” (p. 142). As a matter of fact, this very issue was at the core of Evans’s philosophical 
project as well (even though Evans would not have resorted to the notion of “mechanism” in 
framing the problem) and Montague’s discussion of Evans’s answer to that problem is aimed 
at paving the way for her alternative proposal. Montague agrees with Evans that no purely 
externalist answer to the access problem can be adequate and that an internal requirement 
accounting for the way in which the object is presented is an indispensable ingredient of 
any adequate explanation. Her point of disagreement with Evans concerns the nature of the 
internal requirement. In her view, Evans’s way of accounting for the access problem in terms 
of Russell’s Principle (the “know-which requirement”) was wrong. She says that one of the 
main distinctive feature of her view as opposed to a view such as Evans’s based on (RP) “is the 
emphasis it places on the phenomenological features of experience. It states that a certain 
number of phenomenological features of a perceptual experience need to be in place in order 
for the perceptual experience to qualify as perceiving some particular object […]. The claim, 
then, is that one has to consider phenomenology, narrowly construed, when determining 
the object of a thought or perception” (pp. 145-146). We can rephrase this point by saying 
that the main point of disagreement concerns the nature of the internal requirement: 
Evans characterizes it in epistemic terms (in terms of a notion of knowing-which that he 
took to be more basic than the notion of thinking of an object) while Montague provides a 
phenomenological characterization of it. In order to show the inadequacy of Evans’s account, 
Montague proceeds by presenting some cases in which, even though Evans’s conditions are 
satisfied (according to her interpretation of those conditions),12 there is a strong reluctance 
in allowing that in such cases the subject succeeds in homing her thought on the object. She 
provides an example in which a subject is in causal contact with something (a garden shed) 
but, due to some kind of garbling and distortion, the light-waves reflected by the shed reach 
the subject rearranged in such a way that the subject ends up having an experience as of a 
pink elephant (p. 153). According to Montague, since the subject is in causal contact with the 
shed and has discriminating knowledge about it (in so far as she can locate and track it), it 
ought to follow, if Evans were right, that the subject can think about the shed. But this is false; 
the subject of the example does not see the shed (because her apprehension or representation 
of it is too inaccurate) and a fortiori cannot think about it either (assuming, she adds, that the 
subject has no other access to it); therefore, Montague concludes, Evans’s account is wrong 
(pp. 159-161). The strategy that Montague follows to show that Evans’s internal condition 
11  In Evans’s picture, the necessity of the “location requirement” is grounded on the role played by “fundamental 
ideas”. The part of his work having to do with such ideas and the role they are supposed to play in accounting for the 
“Generality Constraint” is, according to many people, one of the most problematic in his overall picture. I have dealt 
with this topic in Sacchi, 2001, pp. 97-107 where I revised Evans’s requirement with a weaker one based on the notion 
of “apparent location” of the object.
12  I stress this point because, as I shall say, I do not think that her interpretation of Evans’ s conditions does full 
justice to Evans’s account in so far as it does not assign to a notion that occurs in Evans’s picture (the notion of 
“having an adequate conception of the object”) the importance I think it deserves. 
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on the access problem is wrong is therefore the following: first she tries to show that it is 
insufficient in the case of seeing an object; then she extends this point to the more general 
issue having to do with what it is for a subject to have an object in mind.13 It is important to 
clarify that for the sake of Montague’s argument it is fundamental that the case presented 
is not taken as one of hallucination. For if it were, the external requirement would not be 
satisfied: an object must exist in order for a subject to stand in an information-link with it. She 
also rules out that such a case can be taken as one of illusion, because illusion requires that 
the object be perceived (albeit misleadingly), whereas in the case considered this requirement 
is not satisfied due to too strong a deception on the subject’s part. We can say that the degree 
of deception that this case presents is lower than that of hallucination but somewhat higher 
than that of an ordinary illusory experience.14 Montague’s suggestion is to treat it as a case in 
which while the subject is in visual contact with the object, she is not in perceptual contact 
with it.15 Visual contact for her is something in between mere informational contact and 
true perceptual contact. It requires visual phenomenology and also that some counterfactual 
dependencies related to eyes and body movement hold (the subject’s experience of the object 
must correlate with his eyes and body movements).16 But mere visual contact is not enough 
for seeing, she claims. The subject of the example does not see the shed because there is too 
much mismatch between how things appear to her and how things are. It is precisely such a 
mismatch that prevents the subject from being in perceptual contact with the shed. But how 
wrong can one be before perceptual contact fails? Her answer to this question is the “matching 
content view” according to which “for a perceptual experience to be about an object, there 
must be a certain degree of match between the properties an object has and the properties 
the perceptual experience represents the object as having” (p. 145). The idea is therefore that 
one must correctly represent a sufficient number of the object’s properties in order for it to 
be true that one sees the object. To sum up: in order for someone to be in perceptual contact 
with an object it is not enough either to stand in an informational contact with the object, or 
to stand with it in visual contact, or to possess a discriminating idea of the object. What more 
is required is that the subject’s experience has the right kind of content, a content which she 
qualifies as phenomenological in so far as it concerns the properties that the represented 
object (phenomenally) appears to have. Which object a given subject is in perceptual contact 
with is the one that satisfies most or a ‘weighted most’ of the set of the properties that the 
subject’s experience represents the object as having. 
Is Montague right in claiming that Evans’s account is inadequate because he would have 
said that the subject of the example can think about the garden shed? I have to express my 
disagreement with Montague on this point. In my view, what Evans would have said as regards 
her example, which is very similar to one he himself provides (Evans, 1982, pp. 196-197), is 
that the subject cannot be credited with such a thought because, even though his attempted 
13  Actually, it has to be stressed that Russell’s Principle was not meant by Evans as an internal requirement 
applicable to perceptual experiences, but only to thoughts. Not only the claim that in order to perceptually experience 
an object a subject has to have a discriminating idea of it does not figure in his work, but it also seems to collide with 
his adherence to non-conceptualism as regards the content of perceptual experience. 
14  Ultimately it is not very clear how one should treat such a case. Is it a case of imagination somewhat prompted by 
visual stimulation?
15  I find this distinction somewhat unclear. Moreover, her characterization of the notion of perceptual contact in 
terms of phenomenal content seems to me to be tendentious.
16  This is how Montague characterizes this notion: “Visual contact is causal and sensory contact of a sort that 
involves the impact of light on a sensory organ, and gives rise to experiences of colour and shape of a kind that can be 
sufficiently indicated by saying that they are of the same sort phenomenologically speaking as experiences of the kind 
we call ‘visual’” (2016, p. 154).
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thought is based on information derived from the shed, the information-link at play does 
not provide the subject with an effective route to the shed (notwithstanding the subject’s 
ability to locate and keep track of it). And this is so because the conception of the target which 
governs the subject’s attempted thought of the shed is too defective in this case. The notion 
of conception that Evans mobilizes in this connection is very important to address the issue 
at stake; I think that Montague, while considering the passages in which Evans makes use of 
this notion, does not give it the importance it deserves. According to Evans, an information-
based thought is governed by a conception of its object that is the result of a belief about how 
the world is which the subject has because he has received information (p. 121).17 He adds 
that as far as perceptual demonstrative thoughts are concerned, their governing conception 
is determined only by the content of the perception. He admits that the information link may 
not be functioning well so long as it provides an effective route to the object (p. 179). This 
requirement is not satisfied when there is too much error in the perceptual-based beliefs 
that the subject forms on the basis of the information-link and which ground the guiding 
conception of his attempted thought. Seeing a garden shed as a pink elephant is to host an 
inadequate conception of the target which, in turn, prevents a subject from entertaining a 
sufficiently clear idea of the object. In such cases, Evans says, “there is some inclination to 
say that the attempted thought lacks a content” (p. 197). So, to resume my assessment of this 
case, I think that, given the role that Evans assigned to the notion of “having an adequate 
conception of the object” he would not have taken cases such as the garden shed one as 
counterexamples to his account of perceptual based demonstrative thoughts.18 If I am right, 
it follows that Evans’s account of the internal requirement is more complex than Montague’s 
reconstruction of it in so far as it does not seem to be exhausted by Russell’s Principle. By 
integrating within the picture the notion of “having a conception of the object” the result is a 
threefold requirement on a subject’s ability to perceptually demonstratively refer to an object 
in one’s thought: 
i. the subject must stand in an information-link with something (the thought’s target);
ii. the subject must be able, on the ground of that link, to form an adequate conception of the 
thought’s target;
iii. the subject must be able, on the ground of that conception, to form a sufficiently clear idea 
of an object (an idea that singles that object out from any other object).
It is true that in the example that Montague provides the subject is in an information-link with 
the shed and moreover possesses discriminating knowledge of it. But, if my interpretation of 
Evans’s requirement is correct, this would not be enough in order to credit the subject with a 
thought about the shed, because in such a case clause (ii) of the complex requirement is not 
satisfied. This said, it has to be emphasized that, besides some few scattered hints, Evans did 
not provide any detailed account of what it is for a guiding conception to be adequate. This 
is certainly a lacuna in his account. But what this lacuna shows is that Evans’s account, as 
17  What he meant in speaking of a subject’s thinking being governed by a conception of its object is that “the way 
he entertains the thoughts (as probable, improbable, true, or false), and the significance he attaches to them (the 
consequences he is prepared to draw from them) are determined by the content of this conception” (p. 121).
18  It is true that Evans says that a subject can have a perfectly clear idea of an object even though she misperceives 
its properties and get altogether quite a wrong view of the thing (p. 179). But he also adds that what is required is that 
the information-link with the object provides the subject with an effective route to the object. In my way of reading 
Evans, the satisfaction of this requirement has to do with the kind of conception of the object that the subject is able 
to acquire on the basis of her perceptual experience.
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it stands, is incomplete, not that it is wrong. What interests me here is to consider whether 
there is a way in which this lacuna could be filled in a way which is consistent with Evans’s 
claim that we can make direct, non-inferential reference in our thinking to ordinary external 
objects.
What is lacking in Evans’s official doctrine is a detailed account of what it is for a subject to 
entertain an adequate conception of a thought’s target. In my view, in order to provide such 
an account, Evans should have assigned to conscious experience a far more important role 
than he did. He stressed that the information received from the object must be consciously 
possessed by the subject (p. 158), but what he meant by this was that the information must be 
poised for use for the direct rational control of thought and action.19 We can say, by resorting 
to Block’s (1995) distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, 
that Evans only considered the cognitive-access aspect of conscious experience, almost 
neglecting its experiential-phenomenal aspect. What was needed instead was an account 
of how an object has to appear in order for a subject to be in perceptual contact with it. He 
acknowledged that not any possible way of appearing is compatible with the subject’s standing 
in perceptual contact with an object. But then he did not say anything about how ways of 
appearing of the object have to be conceived and moreover in which relation do they stand 
with (cognitive) modes of presentation.
Let me expand on this point in order to clarify the connection between cognitive modes of 
presentation, ways of appearing and awareness of the object. In several passages of his work, 
Evans explicitly links the notion of a mode of presentation with the notion of awareness of the 
object (1982, p. 83). Awareness of the object should provide the subject with an “effective route 
to the object”. And yet, cognitive modes of presentation do not seem to be good candidates 
for playing that role. As a matter of fact, in the garden shed example provided by Montague 
the subject possesses discriminating knowledge of the object (she can locate the object and 
keep track of it) and therefore possesses a mode of presentation of the object and yet what 
she lacks is precisely awareness of the object.20 This raises a perplexity that it is important to 
articulate in order to understand what I take to be an ambiguity hidden behind Evans’s use of 
the notion of “having an effective route to the object”. The perplexity is the following: how 
could a subject in a situation such as the one that Montague presents lack an effective route to 
the object, given that she can locate and keep track of it? Isn’t this enough in order to have an 
effective route to the object? In general, Evans’s use of this notion is taken to have cognitive-
epistemic connotations and it is presented in connection with modes of presentation. A mode 
of presentation, so conceived, is something that provides a subject with an epistemic route to 
the object the mode of presentation is a mode of presentation of. In the garden shed example 
we can say that the subject has a cognitive-epistemic route to the object and yet such a route 
turns out to be incapable in homing the thought on the relevant object because of the lack 
of “another kind of route”, experiential rather than cognitive, actually more basic than the 
previous one. How does the notion of having an effective experiential route to the object have 
19  In one of the rare passages in which he talks about conscious experience he says “we arrive at conscious 
perceptual experience when sensory input is not only connected to behavioural dispositions […] but also serves as the 
input to a thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning system; so that the subject’s thoughts, plans, and deliberations are 
also systematically dependent on the informational properties of the input. When there is such a further link, we can 
say that the person, rather than just some part of his brain, receives and possesses the information” (Evans, 1982, p. 
158).
20  People who claim that awareness of the object only requires possession of information about the object enabling 
the subject to point to it will disagree on this point. For a discussion on this issue see e.g. Dretske, 2006. 
4. Modes of 
presentations and 
ways of appearing
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to be conceived then in its application to the content of perceptual experience? I think, and 
this is what I take to be the second reading of Evans’s use of this notion, that such a notion 
in its non-cognitive/epistemic reading, concerns the appearance of the object. A perceptual 
experience provides a subject with an (experiential) route to the object (able to ground a 
cognitive-epistemic route to it) in so far as it makes the object appear to the subject. This is 
required in order to be perceptually aware of the object. A subject cannot be perceptually 
aware of an object if the object does not appear to her and the object’s perceptually appearing 
to her is what provides the subject with an experiential route to the object.21 This conclusion 
has important repercussions on Evans’ picture. Cognitive modes of presentation do not 
account for awareness of the object after all. If such an awareness is not already provided, they 
are by themselves unable to provide it. It follows that Evans was wrong in thinking that they 
are cognitive modes of presentation that provide awareness of the object. 
I think that behind Montague’s criticism of Evans’s account there is a similar diagnosis of 
what is lacking in it. She claims that Evans’s internal requirement (clause (iii) in the threefold 
requirement) is not sufficient because that requirement can be instantiated even in cases in 
which the subject is not in perceptual contact with the object. As I said I think she is wrong in 
claiming that in the case presented Evans would have said that the subject can think about the 
shed (because in such a situation clause (ii) would not be satisfied). But she is right in claiming 
that an internal requirement only framed in terms of Russell’s Principle is insufficient. As I 
said, I take it to be insufficient because, by itself, it does not provide awareness of the object. 
It is true that Evans stressed that the subject needs to possess an adequate conception of the 
object, but he actually did not articulate this point. My suspicion is that had he explicitly 
articulated this part of his proposal, he would have been compelled to downplaying the role of 
(cognitive) modes of presentation in his account and conceive of them as grounded on more 
basic modes of presentation having an experiential nature.
It seems that in his attempt to combine Russell’s picture of direct reference as a kind of 
semantic relation grounded in a basic epistemic relation of acquaintance with Frege’s idea 
that reference is always guided by modes of presentation of the object, Evans has ended up 
impoverishing Russell’s notion of acquaintance to the point of making it unsuited to provide 
the kind of direct (experiential) contact with the object able to sustain awareness of it. But 
could Evans have filled this lacuna without abandoning the idea that perception-based 
thoughts are about ordinary external objects in a direct, non-inferential way?
To start answering this question let us consider whether Evans could have filled such a 
lacuna by adopting something along the lines of Montague’s matching content view. Actually, 
there are passages in Evans’s work that seem to encourage the idea that he had something 
similar in mind when he talks about the adequacy requirements upon a subject’s conception 
of an object.22 He explicitly says that there are cases in which it is not appropriate to credit 
the subject with an adequate conception of the object, because there is too much mismatch 
between how things appear and how things are. Does this show that he could have had in mind 
21  To sum up: I think that Evans’s use of the notion of “having an effective route to the object” is ambiguous between 
a cognitive-epistemic reading and an experiential one. Even though Evans did not explicitly articulate the relationship 
between these two readings of the notion, it seems coherent with what he says about the role of the notion of “having 
an adequate conception of the object” that the experiential reading is more basic than the cognitive-epistemic one. 
Ditto for the relationship between ways of appearing (or experiential modes of presentation) and cognitive modes 
of presentation. The former account for awareness of the object. The latter presuppose such an awareness and 
make it manifest at the cognitive level (in particular, in the subject’s ability to take information from the object as 
immediately germane for the semantic evaluation of her thoughts about it).
22  On p. 134 note 21 for example he says “There is some degree of incorrectness in a subject’s conception of an object 
that makes it pointless to ascribe thoughts about it to him”.
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something along the lines of the matching content view?
In my view, whatever he could have had in mind, such a picture would not have been 
compatible with his idea that singular thoughts secure their reference in a direct, non-
descriptive way. In my view, the adoption of the matching view would not have allowed him 
to preserve this central feature of his account of singular mental reference. To see why this 
is so, let us consider the account that Montague provides of what she calls the mechanism of 
the determination of the aboutness of a perception-based thought. In her view, the thought’s 
aboutness is determined partly by external features (causal-information connections with 
the environment) and partly by internal phenomenal features. What a given thought is about 
is the object that stands in the right kind of causal connections with the thought and that 
satisfies most or a ‘weighted most’ of the set of the properties that the thought’s content 
represents the object as having.23 Such a content involves modes of presentation of the object 
that are only contingently related with the objects a given thought is about.24
Could Evans have endorsed one such model? I think not, because he would have considered 
it inadequate to account for the peculiar way of functioning of singular information-based 
thoughts. For him, such thoughts do not function in a descriptive way and they do not settle 
their aboutness by way of a satisfactional (or causal-satisfactional) mechanism. Rather they fix 
it in a very direct way: the object a given information-based thought is about is the one that 
constitutes the modes of presentation that figure in its content. The object-dependency of 
modes of presentation was for Evans a non-dispensable feature in the account of the nature of 
what he, not accidentally, called singular thoughts. 
It has to be stressed that this point is well taken by Montague, whose account of the access 
problem has actually an important section specifically devoted to the particularity issue. 
For her, a singular thought is a thought that purports to be about a particular individual (in 
this sense it differs from a purely descriptive thought that purports to be about whatever is 
the satisfier of a uniquely identifying definite description). This particularity however is not 
cashed out in terms of object-dependency, but rather in terms of a feature of the cognitive 
phenomenal character of the mental state that grounds the state’s content. She calls this 
feature “the fundamental object-positing feature or taking as object”.25
Whether the peculiar way of functioning of singular thoughts is actually reflected in their 
phenomenology,26 the question still remains as to whether a phenomenological account of 
particularity is adequate to capture the kind of particularity that Evans wanted to capture 
in his account. One important distinction in this connection is that between two senses of 
particularity: the phenomenological and the relational sense.27 It is the latter that Evans 
23  In specifying the mechanism of reference determination, Montague makes use of the so-called “cluster” version 
of the description theory. Her proposal is similar to Searle’s even though, as she clarifies, while Searle’s view proposes 
both a sufficient and a necessary condition on reference, her proposal only requires that the weighted cluster of 
descriptions be a necessary condition (p. 161).
24 The idea that there are internal, phenomenological constraints on the determination of the aboutness of a given 
thought is present in other authors who defend the phenomenal intentionality thesis. A case in point is provided 
by Horgan and Tienson (2002) in particular as regards the role they assign to “grounding presuppositions” (the set 
of presuppositions, determined by phenomenal intentionality, concerning the existence of, the persistence of, and 
various features of, the sort of entities presented in experience (528)).
25  “The idea is that demonstrative thoughts involving bare demonstratives such as [that (thing)] manifest a 
fundamental category of our thinking and indeed our experience in general—the concept or category OBJECT […]. 
Object-positing delivers the this-object of perceptual experience. Even more strongly put, object-positing is the 
experiencing of a this-object. Experiencing this kind of thisness is a matter of being presented experientially with an 
identifiable and usually persisting unity, and this is just what object-positing does” (Montague, 2016, p. 138).
26  This is a claim explicitly endorsed by Farkas (2008) for example.
27  For this distinction see e.g. Schellenberg (2010) where the contrast between the two senses is expressed in 
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thought was indispensable in an account of singular thoughts and such a sense is not 
explained by the former, nor can it be reduced to it (Sacchi, 2013). That’s why I think that 
Montague’s proposal could not have been coherently accepted by Evans.
Is there a way in which Evans could have developed his picture in order to integrate the role that 
the appearance of the object plays in an account of awareness in a way compatible with the idea, 
taken from Russell, that the object itself is a constituent of the thought? I think that a positive 
answer to that question can be provided and in the remaining part of my paper I shall try to 
sketch how such an account could be given. One such account ought to satisfy (at least) the two 
following requirements: (i) it ought to mobilize ways of appearing of the object suited to account 
for the subject’s awareness of the object; and (ii) suited to provide a non-satisfactional explanation 
of the mechanism of reference determination. Regardless of whether Montague’s proposal 
satisfies the first requirement, the second one is not satisfied in the picture she provides. 
I think that one of the main difficulties in trying to satisfy both requirements is due to the 
tendency to read the notion of appearance only in its psychological sense (as something 
having only to do with the subjective modifications in the subject’s experience). Actually, 
this is an important sense of the notion of appearance, but it does not exhaust its full sense. 
As a matter of fact, nothing (different from the subject and her inner world) would appear 
to a disembodied soul in an empty world. Something (different from the subject and her 
inner world) appears to us because there is a world out there that appears. And that world 
would still appear even if no experiencing subject existed. In such a case there would not be 
appearing in the subjective, psychological sense, but there would still be appearing in the 
objective sense of the notion (Johnston, 2009). It is precisely this objective sense that is in my 
view relevant to consider here and this sense becomes available once one stops fixing only on 
the subjective reading of the notion. So the relevant contrast here is one between a subjective 
and an objective reading of the notion of “way of appearing”. Let us try to clarify this 
distinction by making an example. Right now in front of me on my desk I have my laptop open. 
My laptop is purple and it appears purple. Its appearing purple has both a subjective reading 
(my experience of the colour of the laptop has a purple-ish phenomenal character) and an 
objective reading (the laptop appearing purple is a feature of the laptop itself: its looking 
purple is as objective as its being purple).28 
The notion of appearance here is connected with the notions of look, seem. Jackson 
famously articulated some strands of these cognate notions by distinguishing three 
different, albeit related senses of them, namely: the epistemological, the comparative 
and the phenomenological. What I am here saying is that such a tripartition does not 
capture the complexity of these notions. There is (at least) a further sense, relevant to the 
phenomenological one, that is objective rather than subjective (Martin, 2010; Maund, 2003, cap. 
7). The notion of a phenomenological-objective sense of appearing, while not as widespread as 
its subjective counterpart, figures in different authors.29 So, there does not seem to be anything 
weird with such a notion. But how could such a notion be used in an account of perceptual 
contact that does not appeal to something along the lines of the matching content view?
the following way: “a mental state instantiates relational particularity if and only if the experiencing subject is 
perceptually related to the particular object perceived. A mental state instantiates phenomenological particularity […] 
if and only if the particularity is in the scope of how things seem to the subject, such that it seems to the subject that 
there is a particular object or a particular instance of a property present” (Schellenberg, 2010, pp. 22-23). 
28  The idea that there are objective ways of appearing is very well expressed in a passage by Austin in which he 
claims “I am not disclosing a fact about myself, but about petrol, when I say that petrol looks like water” (1962, 43).
29  See, for example, Shoemaker (1994, 2000) for the view that appearances are partly objective, and Noë (2005) for 
the idea that appearances are “perspectival properties” of objects. See also Schellenberg (2008) and Genone (2014).
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This is the suggestion toward which I am inclined.30 A subject is in perceptual contact with an 
object (and therefore has an adequate conception of it) if and only if she has an experience 
that is constituted by a phenomenological-objective way of appearing of the object (where a 
phenomenological-objective way of appearing is something that reveals properties that the 
object possesses relative to some environmental-contextual features such as the subject’s 
point of view, the lighting conditions and so on and so forth). Let me make some example. The 
white way of appearing of a white wall under a neutral light is a phenomenological-objective 
way of appearing of the wall, because it reveals a property that the object possesses. But also 
the yellowish way of appearing of the white wall under a yellow light is a phenomenological-
objective way of appearing of the white wall, because it reveals a property that the object 
possesses under those conditions: white objects have the property of appearing yellow under 
a yellow light. Ditto for a round coin appearing elliptical when seen from a certain position. 
A phenomenal-objective way of appearing is objective under several regards: it reveals 
properties of the object and it is something that any subject in the same environmental 
conditions would enjoy. Phenomenal-objective ways of appearing are modes of presentation 
of the object’s properties, they are the way in which those properties are revealed to us; they 
play so to say a “revelational role”. The requirement stated is not satisfied in the garden shed 
example provided by Montague. An elephantine way of appearing is not a phenomenological-
objective way of appearing of the garden shed, i.e.  it is not a possible way in which the garden 
shed can manifest some of its properties. That’s why in such a case I think it is wrong to say 
that the subject can see the shed and consequently think about it. As it turns out, an account of 
perceptual contact framed in terms of phenomenal-objective ways of appearing does not make 
any appeal to the idea, central in the matching content view, that the properties represented 
in the content of the subject’s experience has to match, to a sufficient degree, the properties 
that the object the experience is of possesses.
Phenomenological-objective ways of appearing constitute the contents of the subject’s 
perceptual experiences that ground her perception-based thoughts. I ultimately think that 
something along the lines I have indicated could be implemented within Evans’s picture in 
order to fill the lacuna that his account of perception-based thoughts presents in a way which 
preserves his idea concerning the peculiar way of functioning of this kind of thoughts.
Evans acknowledged that not any possible way of appearing is compatible with the subject’s 
standing in perceptual contact with an object. But then he did not say anything about how 
ways of appearing of the object have to be conceived. I ultimately think that this lacuna has 
its source in Evans’s attempt to avoid the pitfalls of the sense-datum theory which, in his 
view, was responsible for Russell’s inadequate conception of the notion of acquaintance. The 
fact that Evans stripped Russell’s notion of acquaintance of any phenomenological import 
prevented him from providing an adequate account of the converse notion of presentation. 
He tried to account for it in terms of ways of thinking of the objects informationally grounded. 
But modes of presentation, so conceived, are not enough to capture the notion of presentation 
in its full sense. This is so because such modes of presentation (I have labelled them cognitive 
modes of presentation) do not ultimately account for the kind of awareness of the object that 
perceptual contact requires. What I have attempted to do in this paper is showing a possible 
way out that could have enabled Evans to provide a more adequate account of the notion of 
presentation without falling into Russell’s error. This way out hinges on a phenomenological 
sense of the notion of ways of appearing that is objective rather than subjective. 
30  I do not have enough space here to fully develop this proposal. Here I shall confine myself to provide a very 
sketchy presentation of it.
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